The Guardian Finds Skeletons in Trump Lawyer Jay Sekulow's Closet

I hope you go read this article by the Guardian on Jay Sekulow’s fund raising tactics.  I had been aware of the massive amounts of money he has raised through fear mongering but I didn’t know about the actual tactics. This is obscene.
Sekulow has a company that manipulates Christians into giving money they can’t afford to give. Reminds me of K-LOVE. Here is a script:
Sekulow CASE
I hope reporting like this helps dry up the money flow to these people. Most charities of this size simply don’t need your money.
 

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – Political Philosophers on Parade

a570af34_optJune 27, 1787 (click the link to read Madison’s notes)

Summary

There were no votes on substantial issues today. The “highlight” was a speech of “over three hours” by Luther Martin on the need for each state to have an equal vote in the national government. The backdrop for this assertion was the continual tension between large and small states. The smaller state delegates were worried that the larger states would have the upper hand in the new republic.

Influences on the Delegates

Martin’s speech was condensed to the essence by Madison. In so doing, Madison recorded the influences on Martin’s thinking.

In order to prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with states, till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other passages in Locke and Vattel, and also Rutherford. That the States, being equal, cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes, without giving up their liberty. That the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for ten States. That as Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, have forty-two ninetieths of the votes, they can do as they please, without a miraculous union of the other ten. That they will have nothing to do but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Executive, and Judiciary, and Legislature for them, as they please.

All of these philosophers were known to the delegates and they were all influenced by a rational Christianity which called into question supernatural claims in Scripture. For instance, Priestley declared the trinity and doctrine of the atonement to be blasphemous (see page 54, Joseph Priestley, Socrates and Jesus Compared. (Philadelphia: J. Byrne, 1803). According to Locke scholar Greg Forster, Locke “fought hard for the position that people could be saved in Jesus while denying the Incarnation, the Trinity and the Atonement.” For the most part, these political philosophers were enlightenment Christians who were outside or on the edges of orthodoxy. If one wanted to take these influences as evidence of a Christian foundation for the U.S., the next step would be to acknowledge their brand of Christianity (for the most part) bears little resemblance to evangelicalism of today. Thus far, there is no evidence that biblical principles are foundational to “every clause” Constitution as David Barton claimed.
In any case, Martin’s view was only partly represented in the final Constitutional product. As we know, all states have the same number of members in the Senate, but the House of Representatives apportions members according to the population of the state.

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)
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Supreme Court Decision: Should Public Funds Help Build Church Playgrounds?

photo-1473261912432-55081882c1fb_optThe Supreme Court today said yes: if other nonprofits are eligible for state funds to refurbish a playground, a church shouldn’t be denied the same funds on account of being a church. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia MO v. Comer, the Court decided 7-2 that states may not discriminate when awarding such funds (read decision).
At issue was a ministry of Trinity Lutheran — their daycare — and funds which they wanted from MO for placing a rubber surface on the space. MO had a rule which eliminated churches on antiestablishment grounds. The court said the state could not refuse to provide funds to a nonprofit just because it was a church.
On the surface, this may seem like a win for churches, but I am not so sure what strings may be attached, nor does it seem wise for tax dollars to go to a church, even if the church uses those funds for playground resurfacing. Eventually, those dollars aid the church in religious purposes, it seems to me, which might not seem so bad when it is your church but might seem to be a problem when it isn’t.

The 1787 Constitutional Convention – The Senate Continued

June 26, 1787

Summary

The delegates decided today in Convention that Senators should serve six-year terms with compensation for their public service. Madison spent some time outlining two views of the Senate.

Influences on the Delegates

Madison spoke at length about the role of the Senate in a republican government.

In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors and debtors; farmers, merchants, and manufacturers. There will be, particularly, the distinction of rich and poor. It was true, as had been observed (by Mr. PINCKNEY), we had not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient governments, as well as the modern States of Europe; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty, which characterize the latter. We cannot, however, be regarded, even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this country; but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarter, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded against, on the republican principles? How is the danger, in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority, to be guarded against? Among other means, by the establishment of a body, in the government, sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue to aid, on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice, by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Government, he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it.

In support of a longer term for Senators, Madison again appealed to the “ancient governments, as well as the modern states of Europe” as models for the new republic. Madison’s wisdom here is impressive. He calls the delegates to think about an America with diversity and advanced population growth. Madison viewed the Senate as a voice of moderation and virtue, dedicated to justice for all, even minorities.
Although not a fan of republican government, Hamilton agreed with Madison and added his own perspective using Rome and Britain as examples.

It was certainly true, that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property constituted the great and fundamental distinction in society. When the Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the patricians and plebeians, what followed? The distinction between rich and poor was substituted. He meant not, however, to enlarge on the subject. He rose principally to remark, that Mr. SHERMAN seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Government was so formed as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Connecticut. Under the British system, as well as the Federal, many of the great powers appertaining to government, particularly all those relating to foreign nations, were not in the hands of the government there.

Gerry advised again that America is not like Britain and the longer termed deliberative body envisioned by Madison and Hamilton may run afoul of the wishes of the people.

Our situation was different from that of Great Britain; and the great body of lands yet to be parcelled out and settled would very much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked many of our public councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes that there would be a sufficient sense of justice and virtue for the purpose of government. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of elections, and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the people.

James Wilson hoped the Senate would have a permanence which could inspire confidence among foreign powers.

The Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign nations. The true reason why Great Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. Nine years, with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Government an advantage in this respect over monarchy itself.

 

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)
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The 1787 Constitutional Convention – The Senate Debated

photo-1467912407355-245f30185020_optJune 25, 1787 (click the link to read Madison’s notes)
 

Summary

Today, the delegates decided that state legislatures would elect Senators and that they minimum age to be a Senator would be 3o.

Influences on the Delegates

Charles Pinckney from South Carolina opened this day with a tribute to Great Britain but warned that the system of Britain would not work out in the United States.

Much has been said of the Constitution of Great Britain. I will confess that I believe it to be the best constitution in existence; but, at the same time, I am confident it is one that will not or cannot be introduced into this country for many centuries. If it were proper to go here into an historical dissertation on the British Constitution, it might easily be shown that the peculiar excellence, the distinguishing feature, of that government cannot possibly be introduced into our system — that its balance between the Crown and the people cannot be made a part of our Constitution, — that we neither have nor can have the members to compose it, nor the rights, privileges and properties of so distinct a class of citizens to guard, — that the materials for forming this balance or check do not exist, nor is there a necessity for having so permanent a part of our Legislative, until the Executive power is so constituted as to have something fixed and dangerous in its principle. By this I mean a sole, hereditary, though limited Executive.
That we cannot have a proper body for forming a Legislative balance between the inordinate power of the Executive and the people, is evident from a review of the accidents and circumstances which gave rise to the peerage of Great Britain. I believe it is well ascertained, that the parts which compose the British Constitution arose immediately from the forests of Germany; but the antiquity of the establishment of nobility is by no means clearly defined. Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted by the titles of dux and comes, was derived from the old Roman, to the German, Empire; while others are of opinion that they existed among the Germans long before the Romans were acquainted with them. The institution, however, of nobility is immemorial among the nations who may properly be termed the ancestors of Great Britain. At the time they were summoned in England to become a part of the national council, the circumstances which contributed to make them a constituent part of that Constitution, must be well known to all gentlemen who have had industry and curiosity enough to investigate the subject. The nobles, with their possessions and dependents, composed a body permanent in their nature, and formidable in point of power. They had a distinct interest both from the King and the people, — an interest which could only be represented by themselves, and the guardianship of which could not be safely intrusted to others. At the time they were originally called to form a part of the national council, necessity perhaps, as much as other causes induced the monarch to look up to them. It was necessary to demand the aid of his subjects in personal and pecuniary services. The power and possessions of the nobility would not permit taxation from any assembly of which they were not a part: and the blending of the deputies of the commons with them, and thus forming what they called their parler-ment, was perhaps as much the effect of chance as of any thing else. The commons were at that time completely subordinate to the nobles, whose consequence and influence seem to have been the only reasons for their superiority; a superiority so degrading to the commons, that in the first summons, we find the peers are called upon to consult, the commons to consent. From this time the peers have composed a part of the British Legislature; and, notwithstanding their power and influence have diminished, and those of the commons have increased, yet still they have always formed an excellent balance against either the encroachments of the Crown or the people.

Pinckney traced the government of Great Britain back through “the forests of Germany” with a nod to the Romans. Pinckney, like other delegates then referred to ancient republics.

The people of this country are not only very different from the inhabitants of any state we are acquainted with in the modern world, but I assert that their situation is distinct from either the people of Greece or Rome, or of any states we are acquainted with among the ancients. Can the orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can they be found in the United States? Can the military habits and manners of Sparta be resembled to ours in habits and manners? Are the distinction of patrician and plebeian known among us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies, or can the unwieldly, unmeaning body called the Germanic Empire, can they be said to possess either the same, or a situation like ours? I apprehend, not. They are perfectly different, in their distinctions of rank, their constitutions, their manners, and their policy.

Religious liberty was a matter of significant concern to Pinckney. His mention of religious liberty here was a rare reference to religion in this Convention:

Our true situation appears to me to be this, — a new extensive country, containing within itself the materials for forming a government capable of extending to its citizens all the blessings of civil and religious liberty — capable of making them happy at home. This is the great end of republican establishments. We mistake the object of our Government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us respectable abroad. Conquests or superiority among other powers is not, or ought not ever to be, the object of republican systems. If they are sufficiently active and energetic to rescue us from contempt, and preserve our domestic happiness and security, it is all we can expect from them, — it is more than almost any other government insures to its citizens.

Pinckney again returned to his theme that America can’t be governed like Britain:

For a people thus circumstanced are we, then, to form a Government; and the question is, what sort of government is best suited to them?Will it be the British Government? No. Why? Because Great Britain contains three orders of people distinct in their situation, their possessions, and their principles. These orders, combined, form the great body of the nation; and as in national expenses the wealth of the whole community must contribute, so ought each component part to be duly and properly represented. No other combination of power could form this due representation but the one that exists. Neither the peers or the people could represent the royalty; nor could the royalty and the people form a proper representation for the peers. Each, therefore, must of necessity be represented by itself, or the sign of itself; and this accidental mixture has certainly formed a Government admirably well balanced.
But the United States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the British nation — this is, the order of Commons. They will not, surely, then, attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches two of which shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive and Senate [hereditary], because the King and Lords of England are so. The same reasons do not exist, and therefore the same provisions are not necessary.
We must, as has been observed, suit our Government to the people it is to direct. These are, I believe, as active, intelligent and susceptible of good government as any people in the world. The confusion which has produced the present relaxed state is not owing to them. It is owing to the weakness and [defects] of a government incapable of combining the various interests it is intended to unite, and destitute of energy. All that we have to do, then, is to distribute the powers of government in such a manner, and for such limited periods, as, while it gives a proper degree of permanency to the magistrate, will reserve to the people the right of election they will not or ought not frequently to part with. I am of opinion that this may easily be done; and that, with some amendments, the propositions before the Committee will fully answer this end.

Recall that Pinckney introduced his own plan of government near the beginning of the Convention. His oration here set the stage for a consideration of that plan.
 

1787 Constitutional Convention Series

To read my series examining the proceedings of the Constitution Convention, click here.  In this series, I am writing about any obvious influences on the development of the Constitution which were mentioned by the delegates to the Convention. Specifically, I am testing David Barton’s claim that “every clause” of the Constitution is based on biblical principles. Thus far, I have found nothing supporting the claim. However, stay tuned, the series will run until mid-September.
Constitutional Convention Series (click the link)

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